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Advocates of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) argue that it can deliver public infrastructure more 
efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. 
Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has 
received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an 
in-depth, case-based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in 
Ireland. Through detailed semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the 
available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. 
Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall 
procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only 
limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.  
 







A fundamental rationale for the use of the PPP is that it provides a superior alternative to 
traditional approaches to procuring infrastructure that have a history of cost inefficiencies 
and time over-runs.  Much of the literature and commentary on PPP proposes that it provides 
a mechanism for achieving greater efficiency, value for money, improved innovation and 
faster delivery times compared to traditional procurement (Grimsey and Lewis 2005; Geddes 
2011).  Although there is now an extensive and growing literature on the use of PPPs, there 
is still a distinct scarcity of studies that compare the performance of PPP relative to more 
traditional forms of public procurement.  This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature 
by comparing the experience with procuring schools infrastructure in Ireland under both 
procurement approaches. 
 
Under traditional procurement (TP), the public sector typically specifies the quantity and 
quality of the service and enters into separate contracts for the design and construction of an 
infrastructure asset such as a school or a hospital. The project is financed by the public sector, 
which also assumes responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the asset once 
construction is complete.  PPP differs from TP in some key respects.  Whilst there are a variety 
of PPP models, they are generally characterised by a long-term contractual agreement 
between the public sector and a private contractor that bundles the design, construction, 
operation and/or maintenance of the infrastructure and contains provisions for the sharing 
of project risks.  In addition, PPP projects are frequently privately financed.  The key difference 
between both methods is “the allocation of risk and the role of risk as an efficiency driver” 
(Burger and Hawkesworth 2011: 4).   
 
PPPs, therefore, represent a radically different approach to procuring infrastructure assets 
and services and governments around the world have been attracted to PPPs on the basis of 
a number of proposed benefits which Delmon (2017: 2-3) usefully describes as including: 
 Improved prospects for delivering projects on time and on budget; 
 Increased innovation and competition leading to better design, a focus on minimising 
lifecycle costs and managing lifecycle risks; 
 A greater emphasis on project evaluation and due diligence; 
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 A focus on value for money as the main criterion for choosing projects to be delivered 
by PPP. 
 
Whereas these benefits have been widely cited there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the 
actual performance of PPP compared to the TP approach it is expected to improve upon.  This 
paper presents a comparative analysis of both procurement methods which have been used 
for the delivery of new schools infrastructure and services in Ireland.  The paper is structured 
as follows: the first section reviews previous studies of the comparative performance of 
traditional procurement and PPP.  This is followed by a review of the arguments in favour of 
PPP in terms of value for money and faster completion of projects.  The paper then briefly 
reviews how PPP has been used for the procurement of schools in Ireland. It proceeds to 
describe the cases of schools procurement which are used to compare the different 
procurement models.  Following a description of the research methodology, we present our 
comparative analysis before providing a discussion of our results and conclusions.   
 
2. Comparing PPP with traditional procurement models: a review of the literature 
Despite the large volume of empirical research on various aspects of PPPs, only a handful of 
studies have sought to directly compare the performance of PPP compared to traditionally 
procured projects.  These comparisons tend to be based on the time taken to deliver projects 
(time performance) and the relative cost (value for money comparisons) of projects under 
both forms of procurement. Table 1 provides a summary of the main comparative studies and 
their broad findings.   
 
<< Insert Table 1 Here >> 
 
Overall, the comparative studies listed in table 1 fail to deliver a clear consensus as to the 
relative superiority of one form of procurement over the other. An early study by consultancy 
firm Mott MacDonald (2002) examined 39 traditional and 11 PPP projects and concluded that 
PPP projects were more likely than TP projects to be delivered on time and on budget. This 
study examined the relative degree of ‘optimism bias’ – the tendency to be overly optimistic 
about planned actions (Raisbeck et al., 2010).  It compared outturns with initial estimates of 
work duration or capital expenditure and found significant levels of optimism bias for 
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traditionally procured projects compared to PPP.  This study has, however, been heavily 
criticised. UNISON (2005) and Pollock et al. (2007) re-examined the cases used in the Mott 
MacDonald study and identified a number of methodological problems which biased the 
study in favour of PPP. Criticisms regarding the sampling method, representativeness of the 
samples and the relevance of the time period covered led to the conclusion that the findings 
of the original study were unreliable.   
 
Raisbeck et al. (2010) conducted an Australian-based comparative study which sought to 
apply a rigorous methodological approach by developing two project pools of 21 PPP and 33 
traditional projects procured in the early 2000s.  They examined the issues of time and 
(capital) cost performance by comparing actual and expected outcomes.  The authors 
concluded that PPP procurement delivered projects faster than TP and was between 11 and 
31 per cent more cost-efficient. Blanc-Brude et al. (2006) drew different conclusions from 
their study of road projects in the EU. They based their comparison on ex-ante estimates of 
construction costs which they found to be 24 per cent higher for PPP projects.  The UK Audit 
Commission (2003) conducted a detailed study of 10 traditional and 8 PPP projects procured 
in the schools sector and failed to find evidence that PPP performed better than traditionally 
built schools in terms of delivery time, cost and quality.  
 
These comparative studies (summarised in table 1) have faced a number of methodological 
difficulties and have been the subject of a number of criticisms.  For example, Hodge and 
Greve, (2017) express concern that industry-funded studies may have a vested interest in 
portraying PPP favourably, noting that non-academic literature is often favourable towards 
PPP while the academic literature is far more mixed.  One of the most fundamental challenges 
for comparative studies is that no projects are alike.  Comparisons are therefore problematic 
where projects are procured under different institutional frameworks and legal systems.  
Similarly, there are challenges in comparing projects across different sectors such as 
transport, water, healthcare and social infrastructure.  In the context of PPPs, Raisbeck et al. 
(2010) point out that a ‘whole of life’ (or a significant part of it) procurement method is 
difficult to compare with a traditional ‘design and construct’ approach that relies on a 




Against this backdrop, one of the key contributions of this paper is that it addresses the 
challenge of comparing procurement methods and adds to the relatively low stock of 
comparative studies in the published literature.  In addition, it adopts an approach that aims 
to address some (but not all) of the criticisms of previous studies, as well as the challenges 
involved in comparing procurement approaches.  Specifically, we contribute to the PPP 
literature by conducting a detailed case-based comparison of traditional versus PPP 
procurement in the same sector (schools) and jurisdiction (Ireland) over the same time period 
(2013-2015).  In contrast to previous studies that have generally focused on construction cost 
performance, we examine the question of comparative performance in terms of overall value 
for money, which is widely regarded as the principal performance criterion for PPP.  By 
conducting a detailed case-based analysis of two projects procured by different methods our 
paper makes a novel contribution and addresses a significant gap in the extant literature. 
 
3. Examining the performance of PPP and traditional procurement 
The performance of methods for procuring important infrastructure can be assessed in terms 
of different criteria including economic, financial and engineering performance, as well as 
issues around the governance of different arrangements.  As the objective of this study is to 
compare the procurement of schools in Ireland using PPP with the traditional approach our 
comparison is made on the basis of the principal objectives of PPP procurement as described 
in the Irish government’s Framework for PPPs (2003).  This statement of official PPP policy in 
Ireland describes the goals of PPP as including: (1) “speedy, efficient and cost-effective 
delivery of projects” and (2) “value for money for the taxpayer, inter alia, through optimal risk 
transfer and risk management” (2003:3).   
 
Value for money (VfM) which is a commonly articulated objective of PPP is defined by HM 
Treasury in the UK “as the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness 
for purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s requirement. The term whole-of-life is 
used to refer to the lifecycle of the good or service. VfM is not the choice of goods and services 
based on the lowest cost bid”. (HM Treasury 2006: 7).  In countries such as the UK and Ireland, 
the establishment of VfM is an important element of the governance of PPP, and it is widely 




Given the long-term nature of most PPP contracts, it is not possible to accurately establish if 
PPP has delivered VfM until the end of the contractual period.  In order to gauge if PPP delivers 
VfM at the ex-ante or early stages of the PPP contract, it is necessary to conduct a financial 
analysis that involves estimating the whole-of-life-cost to government under both PPP and 
TP.  In Ireland, VfM analysis is conducted by the National Development Finance Agency 
(NDFA), but the relevant data is not made available to the public.  Given this constraint, our 
comparison of PPP and TP assesses the question of VfM in indirect terms.  Our study of 
comparative performance is therefore based on the official objectives of PPPs as stated by 
government namely, timely delivery of new infrastructure and VfM.  The latter is assessed in 
terms of the principal drivers of VfM as identified in the relevant PPP literature, that is (1) 
competition (2) risk transfer and (3) innovation.  The following subsections summarise the 
main propositions from the PPP literature in relation to these aspects of performance. 
 
3.1 Delivery time performance 
There is a strong body of evidence which demonstrates that large traditionally procured 
infrastructure projects are characterised by significant time delays (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; 
Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). One of the principal arguments in favour of PPP is that it provides 
incentives for the completion of projects on time and on budget and a number of empirical 
studies provide support for PPP in this regard (for example, NAO (2003) and Lammam et al. 
(2013)).  In theoretical terms, the advantages of PPP are attributed to features such as 1) the 
bundling of the design, build and operating stages of projects; 2) the use of private finance, 
and 3) the transfer of appropriate risks to the private sector.  Whereas the extant literature 
provides persuasive arguments regarding the relative superiority of PPP as a mechanism for 
achieving faster delivery times, it tends to ignore the important distinction between the 
construction stage of PPP projects and the preceding procurement period.  The distinction 
between these pre- and post-construction stages is important in the context of comparing 
procurement methods.   
 
Focusing on construction times, the main theoretical and empirical literature supports the 
proposition that PPP results in faster delivery of projects.  The transfer of construction and 
operating risks to private contractors incentivises speedy completion of projects as revenues 
for the private sector depend on satisfactory completion and ongoing availability of the asset 
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(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).  Consideration of these advantages must, however, be set against 
the recognition that PPPs are characterised by longer tendering periods compared to other 
procurement methods (NAO, 2007; Reeves et al., 2015). This can be attributed to the more 
complex nature of PPP procurement due to long-term contracts, greater uncertainty and 
prolonged negotiation periods (Owen and Merma, 1999; Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004; KPMG, 
2010; HM Treasury, 2012).  Whether or not PPP leads to faster overall delivery of 
infrastructure projects depends on the trade-off between potential faster construction times 
versus the possibility of longer tendering periods. 
 
3.2 Competition 
Competitive tendering replaces competition in the market (between sellers) with competition 
(between bidders) for the market, and it is argued that this form of competition can yield the 
same efficient outcomes as competitive markets (Chadwick, 1859; Demsetz, 1968). 
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) identify how mechanisms such as competitive tendering and 
franchising require sufficient levels of competition at the bidding stage. Moreover, there is 
evidence from both the theoretical and empirical literature highlighting how the intensity of 
competition for the market is positively related to greater efficiency and cost reduction, which 
is the desirable outcome for policymakers (Szymanski, 1996; Domberger and Jensen, 1997; 
de Bettignies and Ross, 2010; Saussier and Tirole, 2015). 
 
It is unclear if competition is greater for PPP contracts compared to other forms of 
procurement. Engel et al. (2014) emphasise that the benefits of competition only accrue 
when there is “real competition” for the contract. Boardman and Vining (2012) assert that 
PPPs, which are characterised by large-scale, complex and bundled projects, are unlikely to 
attract many interested firms. A low number of bidders can result in some associated pitfalls, 
such as higher transaction costs due to post-contractual lock-in and contract renegotiations 
where firms seek to extract higher profits (Williamson, 1975; Lonsdale, 2005; Engel et al., 
2014).  As the achievement of better VfM is a fundamental objective of PPP, it is, therefore, 






3.3 Risk transfer 
One of the key benefits attributed to PPPs is that it can achieve cost savings and VfM through 
the optimal allocation of projects risks (e.g. construction, operating and finance risks). Under 
traditional forms of procurement most project risks are borne by the public procuring 
authority, whereas under PPP, different risks are identified and contractually allocated to the 
party best suited to manage them (Cooper et al., 2005). By assuming the risks that they are 
most capable of managing, the private sector is incentivised to manage them efficiently 
thereby achieving VfM compared to alternative forms of procurement (Jin, 2010). Optimal 
risk transfer is also encouraged under PPP due to the bundling of the different stages of 
infrastructure development (i.e. design, build, finance and operation) within a single contract.  
Private contractors are therefore incentivised to complete projects on time and within budget 
as payment depends on meeting agreed milestones and performance standards (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004).  
 
There are, however, some obstacles to successful risk allocation and transfer. Froud (2003) 
questions whether in fact some risks are merely “theoretically” transferred, noting that in the 
event of a service breakdown the State would most likely step in, as it cannot transfer the 
political risk of a closed public service. Also, effective risk transfer depends on contract 
enforcement and penalising private contractors in the case of poor performance.  There is 
evidence which shows that this does not always happen (Lonsdale, 2005; Reeves, 2008). For 
example, Demirag et al. (2012) observe that in practice, risks are not always managed and are 
simply insured or hedged against which in turn adds cost.  In addition, an abundance of 
literature has demonstrated that the financial case for using more costly private financing 
under PPP relies on the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector (Pollock et al., 
2002; Shaoul, 2005; Khadaroo, 2008).  Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that 
effective risk transfer cannot take place under other forms of public procurement (Heald, 
2003; Coulson, 2008). 
 
3.4 Innovation 
The quality of the infrastructure asset and related services is an essential part of the VfM 
calculus.  One of the proposed advantages of PPP is that it encourages greater innovation in 
the design and construction of infrastructure which results in improved asset and service 
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quality (Yescombe, 2007; Engel et al., 2014).  Innovation under PPP can contribute to VfM due 
to reduced construction times and overheads as well as reduced operation and maintenance 
costs.  In addition, by bringing the facility into use earlier PPP can result in faster generation 
of income (Linder, 1999; Gunnigan and Eaton, 2008). 
 
The scope for improved innovation under PPP is attributed to a number of factors.  First, as 
the PPP “tendering process is undertaken on the basis of an output specification of service 
requirements incorporating building design and services standards, rather than a prescriptive 
input specification, the private sector has more freedom to innovate, which should lead to 
better quality at a lower cost” (Audit Commission, 2003:4).  Second, innovation is encouraged 
by the competitive tendering process and the long-term nature of contracts that promote the 
use of designs that reduce life-cycle operating costs over the length of the contract 
(Roumboutsos and Saussier, 2014). Third, the involvement of specialist procurement agencies 
can lead to an increased focus on encouraging the private sector to deliver innovative 
solutions (Hoppe et al., 2013).  Finally, the creation of meaningful collaborative partnerships 
can create the space for generating and sharing innovative ideas (Roberts and Siemiatycki, 
2015; Himmel and Siemiatycki, 2017).  
 
Overall, the empirical evidence fails to provide convincing support for claims that PPP delivers 
greater innovation compared to TP.  A number of studies based on case-study and survey 
methods have examined this question and produce no clear consensus in favour of PPP (Eaton 
et al., 2006; Leiringer, 2006; Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008; Winch, 2012; Roumboutsos 
and Saussier, 2014; van den Hurk, 2016).  There have also been a number of sector-specific 
empirical studies on the use of PPP in the schools sector, which is the focus of the analysis in 
this paper.  Studies by the Audit Commission (2003), Ball et al. (2007), Hurst and Reeves 
(2004), Keenan and McCabe (2010), and Reeves and Ryan (2007) all cast doubt on the 
proposition that PPP improves innovation in the delivery of school and related services. This 
absence of conclusive evidence leads Leiringer (2006: 303) to conclude that claims in favour 






4. Background: PPP and traditional procurement of schools in Ireland 
Ireland serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for comparing the PPP and TP methods of 
procurement.  The Irish PPP programme dates back to 1999, and over the last nineteen years, 
24 projects with an aggregate capital value of over €5 billion have been completed.  In a 
review of the programme to date, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2017) 
identified three phases of PPPs.  The first phase focused on roads and primary education 
among others.  Phase 2 focused on social housing and the third phase focused on higher 
education, health, and court projects.  The completion of PPP projects across these three 
phases has resulted in Ireland ranking as one of the countries with the most mature PPP 
markets (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Macário et al., 2015).   
 
It should be noted however that the development of Ireland’s PPP market and finalisation of 
PPP projects was a gradual process.  In his study of the Irish experience between 1999 and 
2013, Reeves (2015) concluded that PPP had delivered important infrastructure that would 
not necessarily have been provided using traditional procurement.  However, the completion 
of PPP projects took time with just six privately-financed PPPs completed by 2013 while others 
remained under procurement or construction. 
 
The time taken to deliver PPP projects was significantly affected by the global financial crisis 
of 2008 which led to a major slowdown in PPP investment both internationally and 
domestically.  In Ireland, over twenty planned PPP projects were cancelled in the aftermath 
of the economic crash but as the Irish government sought to adopt policies that would restore 
the economy to growth; it relied heavily on PPPs.  In July 2012 a Stimulus Plan consisting 
entirely of PPP projects was launched.  This was followed by two further phases of new PPP 
investment that were announced in 2014 and 2015.  In comparative terms, Ireland was 
successful in finalising a number of PPP in this period.  Reeves and Palcic (2017) noted that 
the €1.6 billion of PPP investment in Ireland was significant in the context of the total value 
of €35 billion in PPP contracts that reached financial close in Europe in 2013–2014, and the 
relatively small size of the Irish economy. 
 
It is worth noting that the principal drivers and rationales for PPP usage have shifted over 
time.  In the early 2000s, the principal objective was to use PPP as a mechanism for delivery 
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‘additional’ infrastructure.  After the crisis, PPP was largely used as a tool for stimulating 
economic activity.  Since 2017, with the economy in full recovery, the emphasis has changed, 
and the principal justification for using PPP is to achieve better VfM.  In February 2018, the 
government published its capital spending plans for the next twenty years.  The plan is broadly 
favourable towards the use of PPP but only where it can be shown to offer better VfM.  A 
cautious approach to the adoption of PPP is clearly signalled in the new plan which states that 
“the pursuit of further additional investment projects by PPP over and above this planned 
level of public capital investment would pose a risk that such projects may not achieve value-
for-money and/or could give rise to a level of public capital investment overall that is not 
consistent with macroeconomic or fiscal sustainability” (National Development Plan 2018 - 
2027 :102).   
 
In the context of the broader history of PPP policy and practice in Ireland, this paper assesses 
the performance of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector.  To date, PPP 
projects in the education sector rank second (after transport) in terms of the number of PPP 
contracts finalised.  To date, eight PPP contracts covering 35 schools with a combined capital 
value of €558.2 million have been procured (see table 2). 
 
<< Insert Table 2 here >> 
 
The first three PPP projects for schools and colleges in Ireland were procured by the 
Department of Education.  In 2003, a specialist government procurement agency, the 
National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) was established and was assigned full 
responsibility for the procurement of subsequent PPPs in the schools sector.  Since 2010, the 
NDFA has overseen the completion of four schools bundles with a fifth currently under 
construction.  PPP contracts involve the bundling of a group of schools into a single 25-year 
contract for the design, build and maintenance of the schools with each contract privately 
financed.  After schools are constructed, responsibility for the facilities is retained by the 
contractor while the school board of management remains responsible for educational 
services.  The PPP project examined in this paper (schools bundle 4), consisting of four new 
school buildings, was procured by the NDFA using a negotiated procedure whereby bidders 
were shortlisted following an initial competition, and shortlisted bidders were then required 
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to submit detailed bids. Following the assessment of the detailed bids, the NDFA appointed a 
preferred tenderer with whom they then negotiated the final contract for the schools.  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we compare the procurement of PPP Schools Bundle 4 with 
another bundle of schools procured using traditional procurement (TP).  The TP project we 
examine involved the bundling of schools into a single contract, which was then procured by 
the NDFA, the agency also responsible for procuring PPP schools. Once constructed, the TP 
schools were handed back to their respective school boards of management. The Department 
of Education and Skills (DES) and the NDFA refer to these projects as the “Devolved Schools 
Building Programme” bundles.  Three such bundles were procured by the NDFA using a three-
stage open competition framework panel which is described in more detail in section 5.2. 
These three bundles were made up of a mixture of new build and refurbishment/extension 
school projects. In order to enable a more accurate comparison, we compare only the new 
build school projects involved in this programme, consisting of two schools from bundle 1 and 
three schools from bundle 3.   
 
5. Methodology and results 
The criteria we use to compare both procurement methods are VfM and the time taken to 
complete the delivery of schools infrastructure.  Data collection was based on semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders involved in both procurement processes. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with three key public-sector officials, one from the national 
procurement agency (NDFA) and two from the Department of Education and Skills (DES).  
Interviews were also conducted with four school principals (two PPP and two TP) and two 
members of management from the PPP project company. These interviews were conducted 
between July 2017 and May 2018. Information was also gathered from publicly available 
documentation which was provided by the relevant stakeholders (e.g. contract notice and 
award, user specification documents, procurement documents, planning documents, 
government reports, parliamentary questions and press releases).  
 
As the financial data used by the NDFA in conducting VfM analysis is not publicly available, 
we adopt an indirect approach by assessing the principal drivers of VfM under both 
procurement methods.  We, therefore, conduct a comparative analysis based on: (a) the 
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duration of procurement and construction periods (since longer delivery times are likely to 
be related to higher costs and lower VfM); (b) competition for contracts; (c) risk transfer; and 
(d) innovation. 
 
5.1 Time performance: 
As discussed in section 3.1, the theoretical and empirical literature to date broadly supports 
the hypothesis that PPPs lead to faster delivery times compared to TP. Importantly, however, 
the extant literature largely ignores the pre-construction tendering phase where there is 
empirical evidence of lengthy tendering periods for PPPs in Ireland and the UK (see Reeves et 
al., 2015, 2017). We therefore split our analysis of time performance into two key stages: 1) 
the tendering period, i.e. the time from tender advertisement to financial close; and 2) the 
construction period, i.e. the time from financial close to the completion of the asset.  
 
Duration of tendering periods 
Figure 1 illustrates the procurement timelines for both projects with the PPP taking just over 
18 months to reach financial close compared to 13 months for the TP project. The difference 
in tendering periods can be attributed to two key factors. First, the PPP contract is significantly 
more complex as it covers issues that were not included in the TP contract (e.g. private 
financing and facilities management). Second, the negotiated procedure was used to tender 
for the PPP project whereas the open procedure was used in the case of the TP project. The 
negotiated procedure is generally regarded as more complicated as it includes extra stages 
involving dialogue and negotiation (Sánchez Soliño and Gago de Santos, 2010). Both of these 
factors contributed to the longer tendering process under PPP. 
 
<< Insert Figure 1 here >> 
 
This comparison of tendering periods fails to account for some important features revealed 
by our interviews.  The NDFA indicated that the procurement time of 18 months achieved for 
the PPP project was the fastest of any of the five bundles that have been procured to date by 
the NDFA and was in line with their recent target of a maximum 18-month tendering period 
for a PPP project. However, it is important to note that the design element of PPP bundles 4 
and 5 differ significantly from the first three PPP bundles that were procured by the NDFA. 
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For bundles 1 to 3, bidders for each project submitted their own designs as part of the 
competition for the contract, whereas for bundles 4 and 5 detailed specimen designs were 
provided at the contract notice stage and only minimal alterations were allowed thereafter. 
In order to develop detailed specimen designs for bundles 4 and 5, the NDFA had to issue a 
separate tender for architectural services.  
 
<< Insert Table 3 here >> 
 
Table 3 compares the tendering periods for the five PPP schools bundles procured to date 
along with the TP project analysed in this paper. When the tendering period for the 
architectural services required to produce the specimen designs is added to the PPP tendering 
time, it is clear that the speed of tendering for the PPP bundle analysed in this project is no 
longer superior to previous bundles. The tendering for architectural services to produce 
specimen designs was also used prior to the procurement of the TP project. Table 3 shows 
that when the tendering period for architectural services is added to the TP tendering time, 
it is much closer to the PPP tendering times. However, in the case of the TP, the architectural 
services were procured using a much larger panel framework which included non-TP schools 
with the contract awarded only two months before the TP contract notice. On balance, 
therefore, the evidence indicates that the PPP tendering process was no more time efficient 
than previous PPP bundles and was relatively long compared to the tendering period for the 
TP project. 
 
Duration of construction 
Table 4 provides information on the construction times for the four new schools that were 
included in the PPP project along with the five new schools in the TP project (we ignore the 
refurbishment and extension projects included in the TP project for ease of comparison). PPP 
schools took an average of 14.75 months to be completed whereas TP schools took 16.6 
months on average. In order to provide a more meaningful comparison, we compared the 
construction time per 1000m² since the different school projects varied widely in terms of the 
size of schools. Although this is a crude measure of construction time performance, it 
nonetheless indicates that PPP construction times were clearly superior to TP, taking 1.77 
months to construct 1000m² compared to 4.59 months per 1000m² under TP.  
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<< Insert Table 4 here >> 
 
In summary, our analysis shows that TP procurement times are relatively superior to PPP 
whereas construction times are comparatively faster under PPP.  The fact that PPP tendering 
periods are longer is to be expected given the long-term, complex contract involved which 
requires considerable negotiation to reach financial close. The faster delivery time expected 
under PPP only takes hold once the contract is signed and construction commences. In this 
case, PPP was two and a half times more time efficient at constructing schools (on a per m2 
basis) than TP, thereby supporting the claims of the PPP project company and the NDFA that 
PPP incentivises firms to deliver infrastructure more efficiently. One PPP project company 
manager elaborated on this point, stating, “it is in our interest to open the school on time, and 
that is driven by the financial partners’ need to retrieve their investment.”  
 
Overall however, when the procurement and construction times are taken together, the 
aggregate speed of delivery under both the PPP and TP is the same, with both projects taking 
exactly 34 months from the initial design phase to completion. Although our analysis is 
confined to two different projects and our results are not generalisable, the analysis still 
points to the importance of examining the entire process of delivering an infrastructure asset. 
Much of the empirical literature which proposes that PPP leads to speedier delivery of 
infrastructure ignores the importance of the pre-construction design and procurement 
phases. Our analysis points to the need for a more thorough assessment of the entire 
procurement process that incorporates a comparative analysis of alternative forms of 
procurement such as TP when attempting to judge the relative superiority of PPP delivery 
times. 
 
5.2 Competition for contracts: 
Competitive tendering is a crucial driver of VfM.  Comparing the level of competition for 
contracts under both procurement models is complicated by differences between the formats 
of the tendering process used in both models. In the case of the PPP contract, the tendering 
process consisted of two stages. First, a contract notice was issued seeking expressions of 
interest. This was followed by a shortlisting process and submission of detailed bids by those 




The TP process was more complicated.  Under this model, a three-stage process commenced 
with the issuance of a contract notice seeking expressions of interest for inclusion on a 
framework panel of construction companies. Following the selection of a framework panel of 
contractors, the second stage of the procurement process involved the submission of 
expressions of interest from panel members for the construction of three separate bundles 
of schools. A smaller shortlist was then established before the third stage, which involved 
three separate ‘call-off’ competitions for each TP Bundle.   
 
Focusing on the actual level of competition involved in both competitions, in the PPP case, a 
total of three bidders were shortlisted following the submission of six initial expressions of 
interests, each of whom submitted detailed bids to the NDFA. Under the TP model, there 
were eleven expressions of interest in being included on the framework panel for the 
programme. Five companies were included on the panel and a separate competition for the 
three bundles was then held with just two companies shortlisted for the submission of 
detailed bids.  Although shortlisting under the TP model followed two separate stages where 
expressions of interest were submitted, the level of competition can realistically be assessed 
in terms of the number of detailed bids.   
 
Given the significant differences between the two procurement processes, it is difficult to 
draw a definitive conclusion in relation to the comparative levels of competition.  
Nevertheless, our examination of both procurements suggests that the PPP contract was 
characterised by a higher level of competition compared to TP.  This conclusion is based on 
the higher number of detailed bids submitted under PPP.  Moreover, as tenders under the TP 
approach were mainly related to construction, the bundled nature of PPP contracts required 
higher levels of detail in relation to elements such as operation, maintenance and especially 
finance.  This generally leads to the submission of bids from an international pool of 
companies and investors with the resources required to assemble detailed PPP bids (e.g. 
BAM, Balfour Beatty).  In the case of the TP model, all of the shortlisted bidders were domestic 





5.3 Risk transfer: 
As risk sharing is an integral part of infrastructure procurement under PPP, the identification, 
allocation and valuation of project risks were part of the ex-ante stage of procurement in this 
case.  Interviews with officials from the procuring agency (NDFA), the sponsoring government 
department (DES), and the PPP project company revealed a strong consensus that project 
risks were allocated to the most suitable parties.  In addition, one project company manager 
asserted that “all risks transferred were appropriate and adequately compensated, as the 
private finance partner would not agree to the contract otherwise”.  
 
Notwithstanding these responses, it must be noted that details regarding the allocation of 
risks in the case of the PPP project are not publicly available.  In order to gather as much 
information as possible, we covered the issue of risk sharing in semi-structured interviews 
with the principal stakeholders including the project company and the NDFA.  We also 
conducted an extensive search and analysis of websites and official documents regarding the 
procurement of the PPP project.  This enabled us to determine a basic breakdown of how 
risks were allocated (shown in table 5). Whereas risk sharing is not a central feature of TP, we 
did cover this issue in interviews with the NDFA, DES, private contractors and school 
principals.  The relevant information around allocation of risks in the TP project is also 
provided in table 5. 
 
The public sector takes full responsibility for demand (attendance numbers) and 
political/regulatory risks (changes in government, regulations, etc.) under both forms of 
procurement.  A key finding is that design and construction risks are assumed by the private 
sector under both PPP and TP approaches.  Precise details about the nature of design and 
construction risks were not made available  However, the interviewee from the national 
procurement agency (NDFA) confirmed that there was little substantive difference in the 
nature of design and construction risks transferred under TP and PPP since financial penalties 
applied in the event of late delivery in both cases.   
 
As design and construction risks are among the most important of overall project risks 
(Siemiatycki and Farooqi, 2012; Khadaroo, 2014), the comparative advantage of PPP in terms 
of risk transfer is curtailed in this regard.  Any relatively positive incentive effects of risk 
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transfer under PPP that remain in our comparative case study relate only to the financial, 
operating, availability and lifecycle risks assumed by the PPP project company over the 
contract period.     
 
<< Insert Table 5 here >> 
 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits associated with the transfer of these risks, it is worth 
noting that interviews with school principals and the DES highlighted that the transfer of 
operating and lifecycle risks under PPP created more contractual rigidity compared to TP. 
Both of the PPP schools’ principals that were interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the 
constraints they faced when seeking to make alterations to facilities and the considerable 
time and resources required to make desired changes.   
 
For example, one school principal sought to install new computers in a classroom for students 
with special needs but was prevented from doing so as this was not provided for in the PPP 
contract.  In this case, it took almost ten months of negotiations before the issue was resolved.  
The alterations required by the schools were only agreed after the project company 
transferred responsibility for the relevant classroom to the school.  The school principal also 
expressed the view that such a change would have taken one week in a TP school.  Another 
PPP school principal expressed frustration about their request for an extension to the facility 
to add a special needs unit.  They reported that this change was actively discouraged by the 
NDFA and the DES, due to fears that renegotiations could result in the public sector being 
overcharged by the project company, which was in a strong bargaining position.  Such issues 
did not arise in TP schools where principals have full discretion over any changes made to the 
school facility.   
 
The ex-post bargaining evident in these cases is well documented within the existing PPP 
literature. For example, in their analysis of PPP projects in the UK, Edwards et al. (2004) found 
that significant transaction costs arose as a result of the long-term nature of the contract.   
These costs can arise due to the lack of flexibility in long-term PPP contracts, which the 
National Audit Office (2018) illuminated in its review of the PPP experience in the UK. Their 
report highlighted how various government departments that procured infrastructure 
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through PPP reported that operational inflexibility was a drawback and that modifications to 
contracts can be costly with lenders and investors charging administrative and management 
fees (NAO, 2018: 23). 
 
The importance of risk transfer in terms of driving VfM under PPP is widely recognised in the 
PPP literature (for example, Audit Commission, 2003; Heald, 2003; Ball et al., 2007). In terms 
of our comparison of risk allocation under both procurement methods, our analysis fails to 
provide unequivocal evidence that PPP delivered a superior allocation of risks compared to 
TP.  Instead, we find that the scope for greater efficiency (VfM) under PPP depends on the 
trade-off between the benefits derived from transferring availability and operating risks with 
the increased transaction costs arising from inflexibility related to long-term contracts.   
 
5.4 Innovation:  
The potential for improved private sector innovation under PPP is mainly attributed to the 
use of output specifications instead of more prescriptive input specifications that are typically 
used under TP. However, the procurement of PPPs by the NDFA has recently shifted away 
from the use of output specifications, and the PPP project that we examine in this paper 
involved the NDFA providing bidders with detailed specimen designs for schools included in 
the PPP bundle. Moreover, the NDFA secured planning permission for the schools before 
procurement commenced. Bidders were allowed limited scope for enhancing the specimen 
designs that were provided, and in interviews, the NDFA, the project company and the DES 
provided a consensus view that the use of specimen designs placed strict limits on the scope 
for bidders to provide innovative designs and features. As the schools procured under TP were 
also constructed on the basis of specimen designs provided by the NDFA, there was no clear 
difference between both procurement methods in terms of scope for better innovation. 
 
Although interviewees could not identify clear examples of design innovations under either 
procurement method, they tended to be more positive about overall innovation under PPP 
due to some features that were added to reduce energy consumption and improve the overall 
environmental sustainability of the PPP schools.  Some interviewees drew attention to 
innovations that were relevant to the operational stage of the PPP project. These included 
aspects such as the integration of building information management software with the 
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schools’ helpdesk function which enables more efficient management of the facilities. The 
PPP project company also highlighted the use of new technologies aimed at reducing costs, 
including the use of automated technology such as robotic cleaners and robotic lawnmowers. 
One interviewee asserted that such innovations are unlikely to occur under TP, where 
following hand-back to school management, the upfront costs of such technology may be 
prohibitive. On the other hand, cost-saving innovations under longer-term PPP contracts are 
achievable, but as one SPV interviewee stated “we want to avoid innovations for the sake of 
it, we’re a private company, if it will reduce costs or benefit us in the long run, we’re happy 
to invest at the start of the project”. 
 
Overall, our comparison provides insufficient evidence of greater innovation under PPP 
relative to TP. Our findings do, however, raise two questions about innovations under PPP. 
Firstly, can a feature that is specified by a procurement agency be considered an innovation? 
Secondly, who benefits from the innovation under PPP? Incentives to cost-save drive these 
operational innovations which are internalised by the PPP project company. Whether these 
innovations contribute to VfM for the state relies entirely on the assumption that the resulting 
cost-savings are passed on in the form of lower availability payments or bid prices.   
 
6. Discussion and conclusions: 
In economic terms, the popularity of PPPs as a model for procuring infrastructure and related 
services can be attributed to several factors. At the broadest level, these include the belief, 
held by some, that private sector involvement in public service delivery brings inherent 
benefits. In addition, governments have been attracted to PPPs for fiscal reasons, especially 
where borrowing limitations encourage off-balance sheet financing of infrastructure 
investment. Economists have also provided theoretical support for the adoption of PPPs. 
Features of the PPP approach such as the bundling of activities and superior risk transfer (Hart 
2003; Iossa and Saussier 2018), competition for contracts (Engel et al. 2014; Saussier and 
Tirole 2015) and the privatisation of the finance function (Grimsey and Lewis 2004; de 





The case for PPP has also been based on the poor track record of traditional public 
procurement methods that is frequently highlighted by the media but which has also received 
systematic empirical support (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Escalating costs and time overruns have 
bedevilled many traditionally procured infrastructure projects across the world and have 
made arguments in favour of PPP more persuasive. Traditional procurement, therefore, 
provides the counterfactual for any analysis of the performance of PPP. However, it is striking 
that very few studies explicitly compare the performance of PPP relative to traditional 
procurement.   
 
This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature and provide evidence on the relative 
performance of PPP in the case of Ireland where it has been used extensively since the early 
2000s. Specifically, we examine the case of schools procurement which has constituted a 
major element of overall PPP investment in Ireland since the commencement of the 
programme.  The projects that we examine possess three basic characteristics that validated 
our comparative analysis and provided advantages vis-à-vis previous studies in the 
international literature.  First, in both cases, the infrastructure procured is broadly similar.  
Second, both projects were procured over a similar time period (2013-2015). Third, the 
sponsoring government department (Education) and responsible procurement agency 
(NDFA) were the same for both projects, thereby ensuring that the representatives we 
interviewed had direct involvement with both forms of procurement.   
 
Our analysis examines performance in terms of two principal criteria: delivery time 
performance and value for money.  Essentially, we test the hypothesis that PPP outperforms 
traditional procurement under both criteria.  We find no evidence to support the claim that 
PPP delivers infrastructure faster than traditional procurement. Unlike previous studies, our 
analysis covers the entire period between contract notice (advertisement) and the 
completion of construction. One of the key findings of our study is that it demonstrates the 
importance of considering the entire procurement process instead of focusing on the 
construction period only as most other studies do.  
 
Compared to earlier studies that examine financial performance in terms of construction 
costs, our study is relatively novel in that it focuses on VfM, which is a more appropriate 
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criterion given the whole-life cost emphasis under PPP.  Also, whereas previous studies have 
mainly compared construction cost outturns with budgeted costs, we compare PPP with its 
counterfactual in terms of the potential for achieving VfM.  Given the unavailability of VfM 
assessments conducted by the NDFA, we adopt an indirect approach that focuses on the 
drivers of VfM under PPP. Overall, we fail to find convincing evidence that PPP will deliver 
VfM compared to traditional procurement. The evidence suggests that the tendering process 
under PPP is marginally more competitive, but we failed to find strong evidence of superior 
risk-sharing under PPP. In relation to the question of innovation (which is part of the VfM 
rubric), there was no evidence that PPP encouraged better performance. While the long-term 
PPP contract we examine is still in the early stages of asset operation and it is too early to 
reach definitive conclusions we find only limited evidence that PPP will deliver greater VfM 
compared to traditional procurement. 
 
An interesting finding from our analysis is the fact that the traditionally procured project in 
this study was procured in a more ‘marketised’ way (for example, construction risk is 
transferred), while the PPP project in our study was procured in a more ‘bureaucratised’ (for 
example, detailed specimen designs were provided to bidders). An interviewee from the 
NDFA highlighted this convergence between the two forms of procurement by stating that 
“for us, it is not PPP versus traditional procurement, but instead about centralised and 
specialised teams who deliver projects. There is no reason why traditional procurement 
projects can’t be procured successfully if the correct expertise is there”. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it conducts an analysis of PPP performance 
compared to its relevant counterfactual of traditional public procurement. It is surprising that 
so few studies have adopted a comparative approach to date, but such studies are critical if 
policymakers are to make informed decisions about procurement and the potential 
downsides of PPP are to be avoided. For example, our study highlighted how considerations 
such as operational stage flexibility can impact significantly on school officials and should 
perhaps be considered as a procurement selection criterion.  
 
Our study has clear limitations since it is based on a comparison of two cases of procurement 
that have limited generalisability. On the flip-side, however, it must be recognised that until 
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detailed datasets based on a large number of observations that enable statistical analysis 
become available, it is necessary to address questions about the comparative efficiency of 
different procurement approaches using an in-depth case-based approach. The research 
conducted in this paper demonstrates that this approach uncovers unexpected complexities 
and nuances (for example, those around the level of competition and time-performance).  
These revelations are less likely to emerge when alternative methodologies, based on larger 
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Table 1: Comparative Studies 






























Compared 11 PPP projects against 39 TP projects. 
Found that TP more likely to exhibit optimism bias 
and underestimate construction time and costs. 
Validity questioned by Pollock et al. (2007) 
Pollock et al. 
(2007) 













No evidence to support the claims of Mott 
MacDonald (2002) that PPP performs better than 
traditional procurement on time and cost. 
















No evidence that PPP delivered schools quicker or 
better designed than traditional procurement. No 
improvement in cost savings or facilities 
management quality.  











Ex-ante PPP costs 24% higher than traditional 
procurement. This difference, however, tends to 
match the cost overruns of traditional 
procurement 
Raisbeck et al. 
(2010) 
Transport, 











PPPs between 11.4% - 30.8% cheaper than TP. 
PPPs 3.4% ahead of time on average, while 













PPP was faster to completion, however there was 
no evidence that it was more cost effective than 
the TP. 










PPP power plants had superior time and 
availability performance than traditional 
procurement, however no difference in cost 
performance identified.  
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Table 2: Education PPPs in Ireland as of December 2016 




No. of Schools 
Pilot Schools Project 2003 2027 63.7 5 
National Maritime College 2004 2029 51.4 1 
Cork School of Music 2007 2032 49.3 1 
Schools Bundle 1 2010 2035 59.9 4 
Schools Bundle 2 2011 2036 81.7 6 
Schools Bundle 3 2013 2039 100 8 
Schools Bundle 4 2016 2042 61.3 4 




Note: The completion of Schools Bundle 5 has been delayed due to the collapse of Carillion in the UK (which was 












plus Design Tender 
PPP Bundle 1 2006-2009 29 months N/A 29 months 
PPP Bundle 2 2008-2010 24 months N/A 24 months 
PPP Bundle 3 2010-2012 27 months N/A 27 months 
PPP Bundle 4 2013-2015 18 months 10 months 28 months 
PPP Bundle 5 2013-2015 21 months 10 months 31 months 
TP Bundles 2014-2015 13 months 11 months 25 months 
Note: In the TP Bundles and PPP Bundles 4 and 5, separate tenders for the design of the schools included in each 
bundle were held. These specimen designs were then included in the tender documents for each bundle when 
contract notices were issued. This contrasts with PPP Bundles 1-3 where the design element was incorporated 
into the overall tendering process. Column 4, therefore, shows the duration of the separate design phase that 






Table 4: Construction Time Periods for New Build DSBP Schools 

















Duleek Boys and 
Girls NS* 




Mar-15 400 13 2700 5.2 
 Nagle Rice NS Apr-15 300 14 1877 7.46 
 Le Chéile NS Jun-15 300 16 1930 8.29 
 Presentation 
Secondary School 
Nov-15 720 21 6643 3.16 
       
Average Construction Period - DSBP     16.6 3616  4.59 
       
PPP SB4 Comeragh College Mar-16 500 14 6485 2.16 
 St Joseph's 
Secondary 
Mar-16 650 14 7379 1.90 
 St. Mary’s College  Apr-16 900 15 8995 1.67 
 Skibbereen 
Community 
May-16 900 16 10500 1.52 
       
Average Construction Period - PPP 
SB4 




              
Source: Information from ndfa.ie (2017) * Duleek Boys and Girls NS are separate schools, however, 

















Table 5: Risk allocation on respective projects 
Type of Risk PPP Project Traditional Procurement 
Planning and Legislative Risk Shared Public 
Design Risk Private Private 
Construction Risk Private Private 
Lifecycle and Project Risk Private Public 
Operating Risk Private Public 
Availability Risk Private Public 
Demand Risk Public Public 
Financial Risk Private Public 
Political and Regulatory Risk Public Public 
Source: Information acquired through documents analysis and semi-structured interviews 
 
Figure 1: Procurement Process of the PPP and TP Schools Projects 
 
